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THE PROBLEM OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

FOR ZONING AND LAND-USE
REGULATION
Jonathan B. Sallet*

In each of its past two terms, the Supreme Court has considered whether
landowners should receive monetary damages if zoning and land-use regulations "take" their property within the meaning of the fifth amendment.'
Neither Agins v. City of Tiburon2 nor San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City
of San Diego3 answered the question presented. In Agins, the Court did
not reach the question because it ruled that the challenged municipal activities did not constitute a "taking."' In San Diego Gas & Electric Co., the
Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the controversy.5
Nonetheless, the opinions in both cases, and especially Justice Brennan's
dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co., shed significant light on the future
resolution of this issue.
The practical significance of the question was demonstrated by the filing
of numerous amici briefs in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. in support of the
city of San Diego's contention that it need not pay monetary damages to a
landowner whose use of property is restricted by land-use regulation, at
least where the landowner has access to equitable remedies. The United
States, seventeen states, other California municipalities and state agencies,
and more than a dozen private conservation organizations supported the
city.6 These amici, along with the city, warned that the recognition of damages as a remedy would seriously threaten municipal and local budgets
* A.B., Brown University, 1974; J.D., University of Virginia, 1978. Mr. Sallet is an
attorney with the Washington, D.C. firm of Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin.
1. The fifth amendment provides, in relevant part, that private property shall not "be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment applies to the states and local governments through the fourteenth amendment. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160
(1980).
2. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
3. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
4. 447 U.S. at 263.
5. 450 U.S. at 630.
6. Id. at 622-23 n.*.
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and would inevitably deter local governments from fulfilling their responsibilities to regulate land use for the safety and well-being of their citizens.
The possibility that a municipality may incur substantial monetary liability because it has enacted a regulation that is subsequently determined
to constitute a "taking" of property under the fifth amendment subsumes
three issues, each of which has been discussed by the Supreme Court
within the past two years. When landowners seek damages as a result of
local restrictions on the use of land, a court must determine (i) whether the
regulation is a "taking" within the meaning of the fifth amendment, (ii)
whether monetary damages are an available remedy, and (iii) when the
"taking" occurred.
I.

THE "TAKING" ANALYSIS

The fifth amendment to the Constitution requires that private property
may not be "taken for public use" 7 without proper compensation. A determination that municipal regulations have resulted in a public taking of
property is "in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather
than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in
the public interest." 8 For example, when military aircraft flew so close to a
chicken farm that the economic viability of chicken-raising was destroyed
by the noise and light emanating from the aircraft, the Supreme Court
held that the federal government had "taken" an easement on the land.9
The application of the "taking" clause to municipal zoning has not resulted in particularly strict scrutiny of local decision-making by the
Supreme Court. In its seminal decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Really Co. , o the Court considered a constitutional challenge to a restriction
on commercial development that, the Court conceded, devalued the property by seventy-five percent." Nonetheless, the Court, noting that the regulation bore a substantial relationship to the public welfare and did not
inflict irreparable injury to the landowner, held that the zoning plan was
constitutional. 12
Two modem decisions also illustrate the Supreme Court's unwillingness
to conclude that zoning ordinances restrict constitutionally-protected,
property interests. In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,'3 the Court upheld a
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 260.
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
See id at 384.
Id at 395-97.
369 U.S. 590 (1962).
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local ordinance that severely restricted preexisting commercial uses of land
bordering on expanding residential neighborhoods.' 4 More recently, the
Court, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 5 rejected the
contention that New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law restricting
the use of air rights over the Grand Central Terminal constituted a
"taking." 16
The opinion in Agins v. City of Tiburon 7 provides the Court's most recent analysis of the constitutionality of land use regulations. The appellants in that case acquired five acres of unimproved land in Tiburon,
California. According to the appellants, their land "possess[ed] magnificent views of San Francisco Bay and the scenic surrounding areas [and
had] the highest market value of all lands [in Tiburon]."' 8 The appellants
purchased the property with the intention of subdividing it into several
residential properties. 9 In 1973, Tiburon adopted two zoning ordinances
in order to conform with a state requirement that the city prepare a general
plan to govern land-use and the development of open-space land. The city
classified the Agins' property as "RPD- 1," a designation that permitted the
land to be used for the construction of up to five single-family dwellings on
the five-acre lot."°
The appellants did not submit a specific proposal for development on
their site. Instead, they brought suit in state court, challenging the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance. This decision, which was apparently
based on the appellants' belief that the city would not approve the building
of all five houses that could be permitted under local law, barred the appellants from arguing that the ordinance prohibited all development. 2 '
14. The facts of Goldblau concerned a company that had mined sand and gravel on a
38-acre tract in the town of Hempstead, New York for more than 30 years when the town
enacted a safety regulation that effectively shut down the mining operation. The Court held
that the land-use regulation was a proper exercise of the town's police power and did not
constitute a "taking." Id at 594, 596-97.
15. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
16. The case arose after Penn Central's Grand Central Terminal was designated a
"landmark" and the block it occupied a "landmark site" under New York City's Landmarks
Preservation Law. As a result of the designation, Penn Central was refused permission to
construct a 53 story office building above the terminal. In holding that the application of the
New York law to Grand Central Terminal did not constitute a "taking," the Court emphasized that (i) the city had not forbade all construction above the terminal, and (ii) the city
had allowed the property owners to transfer development rights over Grand Central Terminal to other properties in the immediate area. Id at 136-37.
17. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
18. Brief for Appellant, at 4, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 (1980).
19. 447 U.S. at 262.
20. Id at 257.
21. Id at 260.
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The Supreme Court held that "[b]ecause the appellants have not submitted
a plan for development of their property as the ordinances permit, there is
as yet no concrete controversy regarding the application of the specific
zoning provisions."22
The Agins Court did consider whether the enactment of the zoning ordinance on its face constituted a "taking" of the appellants' property. The
Court recognized that no precise rule exists to weigh the private and public
interests that must be balanced to determine whether public regulation has
infringed private usage to an extent prohibited by the fifth amendment.2 3
The Court, however, applied a three-part test to guide its consideration of
this issue. The Court considered whether the zoning ordinance (i) substantially advanced legitimate governmental goals, (ii) benefited the appellants, and (iii) frustrated the appellants' reasonable investment
expectations.2 4
Applying the test to the facts inAgins, the Court was persuaded that the
zoning ordinance substantially furthered legitimate governmental interests
because of the existence of both state and local policies favoring the preservation of open-space land. 25 Next, the Court noted that the zoning plan
provided benefits to the appellants by insuring the orderly development of
surrounding property. 26 Finally, the Court noted that because the appellants' claimed that the best possible use of their land was residential, the
zoning ordinance did not frustrate the appellants' reasonable investment
expectations. 21
The Court's analysis provides considerable guidance to municipalities
and local governments faced with fifth amendment challenges to zoning
ordinances. Initially, local governments should be alert to the possibility
that landowners have failed to take the necessary steps to ensure that a
court is presented with a concrete controversy. In Agins, the failure of the
appellants to submit a development plan prevented them from asserting
22. Id
23. Id
24. Id at 261-62.
25. Id at 261. In the course of adopting the zoning ordinances at issue in Agins, the
Tiburon City Council adopted findings that facilitated the Supreme Court's analysis of the
legitimacy of the ordinances. The City Council concluded that "[i]t is in the public interest to
avoid unnecessary conversion of open space land to strictly urban uses, thereby protecting
against the resultant adverse impacts, such as air, noise, and water pollution, traffic congestion, destruction of scenic beauty, disturbance of the ecology and environment, hazards related to geology, fire and flood, and other demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl."
Tiburon, Ca., Ordinance No. 124 N.S. § 1(c) (June 28, 1973), quoted in Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 261 n.8.
26. 447 U.S. at 262.
27. Id at 263 & n.9.
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their claim that the inevitable effect of the local ordinance would be to
prohibit any development of their land. u" Whether viewed as a ripeness or
exhaustion requirement, the Court's holding requires landowners to follow
local procedures before they may challenge the application of discretionary regulations.
A municipality should explicitly identify the interests of health and
safety that support the land-use regulation. If the ordinance is reasonably
designed to avoid the ill-effects of urbanization or to advance any other
governmental interest in a safe and healthy community, it is unlikely that
any federal court will determine that a local regulation fails to promote
substantially a legitimate goal.29 Legitimate governmental interests are not
confined, of course, to tangible problems of health and safety. The
Supreme Court has recognized that aesthetic considerations also may sup30
port local regulation of property interests.
In addition, a municipality should emphasize that land-use planning
that permits orderly growth may help maintain the property interest of the
very landowners who challenge the regulations. In Agins, for example, the
zoning ordinance required that any plan of development be compatible
with adjacent development. 3 ' The city also stated that it would consider
whether the density of new construction would be offset by adjoining open
space. 32 In this situation, where the appellants' property was within a general land-use plan, it appears that the city's careful consideration of adjoining development might well aid, rather than frustrate, appellants'
attempts to develop their land and to convey high-priced residential property. The Court stated that "[iln assessing the fairness of [a] zoning ordinance, these benefits must be considered along with any diminution in
market value [suffered by the landowners] .''3 Thus, the second Agins factor gives municipalities a formidable offensive weapon. A municipality involved in litigation should not be content merely to rebut landowners'
28. Id. at 260.
29. In 1928, the Supreme Court did strike down a local zoning ordinance on this
ground. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). Local regulations that further unconstitutional goals, such as racial segregation, would also fail to survive the application of the first portion of the Agins three-part test. See generally Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
30. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 261 & n.7; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 US. 104, 129 (1978); Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
31. Tiburon, Ca., Ordinance No. 123 N.S. § 2 (F), (June 28, 1973), quoted in Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 262.
32. Id
33. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
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charges that their land has been rendered valueless; it should attempt to
demonstrate that the regulation actually benefits the challenger.
Finally, a municipality must be aware that courts will scrutinize, although perhaps without great vigor, whether regulation of property has
frustrated economic expectations. During its. 1979 term, the Supreme
Court decided two cases in addition to Agins that provided substantial discussion of this issue. In Agins, the Court concluded that investment expectations had not been unreasonably disturbed.3 4 In Andrus v.Allard 35 and
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 36 the Court took different, and perhaps inconsistent, views of the effect of governmental regulation on economic
expectations.
In Andrus v. Allard, the Court faced the question whether federal laws
prohibiting the sale, but not possession, transportation or non-commercial
transfer, of eagle feathers constituted a "taking" of that property. The
Court recognized, in a phrase resplendent with understatement, that a ban
on the ability to sell property imposes a "significant restriction" 3 7 upon the
property owner. But the Court asserted that "[alt least where an owner
possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand'
of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its
entirety., 38 Apparently because the federal law did not wholly deprive the
eagle feathers of all economic value-the Court suggested that they might
be exhibited for an admission charge 3 9 -the federal laws were held not to
be a "taking."
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 4° the Army Corps of Engineers tried to
prevent the petitioners from excluding public access to their marina. The
petitioners, owners of a private pond, had invested millions of dollars to
develop the area into a marina community. 4 ' The Court also noted that
petitioners had improved the pond so that it was navigable, and had done
so with the government's consent.4 2 Upon consideration of these factors,
the Court "[held] that the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a
fundamental element of the property right, falls within [the] category of
' 43
interests that the Government cannot take without compensation.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id
444 U.S. 51 (1979).
444 U.S. 164 (1979).
444 U.S. at 65.
id at 65-66.
Id
444 U.S. 164 (1979).
Id at 167-69.
id at 178-79.
Id at 179-80 (footnote omitted). Despite this sweeping language, the Court held, in
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The holding in Kaiser Aetna creates some tension with the broad language of Andrus v. Allard that suggests that the elimination of any single
"strand" of the bundle of property rights cannot so frustrate a reasonable
expectation of economic return as to effect a "taking." The holdings can be
reconciled to some extent by relying on the distinction between physical
invasions of private property, at issue in Kaiser Aetna, and governmental
regulation that does not involve physical invasion. Indeed, the Allard
Court invoked just this difference in order to distinquish its holding from
the decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon," in which the Court held
that a state law banning the mining of coal in a manner that would cause
the subsidence of any house was a "taking." The Allard Court emphasized
that in Pennsylvania Coal, unlike in the present case, "the loss of profit
opportunity was accompanied by a physical restriction against the removal
of the coal."4" Conversely, the Court in KaiserAetna stated that the government's action in that case would "result in an actual physical invasion
of the privately owned marina."4 6
The emphasis on physical invasion reinforces the impression left by the
opinion in Agins that zoning and land-use regulation, which typically do
not involve physical invasions, will seldom effect a "taking" of property.
The Supreme Court's analysis of such laws demonstrates that regulation is
likely to be invalidated only if it severely and unreasonably limits any economically viable use of property.
In sum, the Agins three-part test provides municipalities and other local
governments with considerable guidance on how to rebut challenges to the
constitutionality of zoning and land-use regulations. But, neitherAgins nor
any other Supreme Court decision provides city planners with absolute
a case decided later in the same term, that abrogation of the "right to exclude" does not
always constitute a "taking." In PruneyardShopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980),
the Court considered a constitutional challenge brought by a privately owned shopping
center to a state constitutional provision that allows individuals to exercise free speech rights
on shopping center property. The Court recognized that the state constitutional provision
abrogated the ability of the shopping center to exclude persons, but held that there was no
"taking." 447 U.S. at 82-85. The Court, speaking through Justice Rehnquist, who authored
the majority opinion in Kaiser Aetna, distinquished its earlier holding in that case. The
Court emphasized that the government's action in KaiserAetna would have interfered with
the property owner's reasonable expectation in governing the profits of its investment. Id. at
84. By contrast, the petition in Robins failed to show that the presence of individuals exercising rights of speech and petition on its property would "unreasonably impair the value or
use of their property as a shopping center." Id at 83. Robins thus indicates that physical
invasion, although an important element in determining whether governmental action constitutes a taking, will not always be determinative.
44. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
45. Allard, 444 U.S. at 66 n.22.
46. Kaiser-Aetna, 444 U.S. at 180, But see supra note 43.
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assurance that their regulations will not "take" private property. As the
Supreme Court has emphasized, a determination of whether private property has been "taken" "calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for
the application of logic."' 47 Accordingly, local governments must pay considerable attention to the possible effects of a court judgment that local
regulation has resulted in a "taking" under the fifth amendment.
II.

THE AVAILABILITY OF A MONETARY REMEDY

The lawsuit in Agins v. City of Tiburon48 began when the landowners
filed an action seeking $2 million in damages for inverse condemnation.
Inverse condemnation is "a shorthand description of the manner in which
49
a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property"
when a government has not attempted to gain title to the property by eminent domain. "Eminent domain refers to a legal proceeding in which a
government asserts its authority to condemn property."5 In essence, the
landowners in Agins were claiming that they were owed compensation for
land that Tiburon had "taken" without judicial process.
The California Supreme Court held that an action for inverse condemnation would not lie. 5 ' The court explained that landowners may not "sue
in inverse condemnation and thereby transmute an excessive use of the
police power into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be paid."5 2 Because the United States Supreme Court inAgins
determined that there was no taking, it did not consider the validity of the
state supreme court's ruling. 3
Six days after the decision in Agins, however, the Supreme Court agreed
to review another case from California that presented the identical issue.
In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 5 4 a public utility
challenged the actions of the city of San Diego. In 1966, the utility had
acquired a parcel of land in San Diego for possible use as a nuclear power
plant site. Two hundred and fourteen acres of that land, which formed the
centerpiece of the lawsuit, were located in an estuary. 5 That land was still
unimproved in 1973 when the city rezoned portions of the utility's proper47. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. at 65.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

447 U.S. 255 (1980).
United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
Agins, 447 U.S. at 258 n.2.
Agins, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
Id at 273, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
447 U.S. at 262.

54. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).

55. Id at 624.
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ties, placing the land within the city's open-space area.5 6 Despite this
designation as open-space land, the city stated that construction of a nuclear power plant on the site 57would not necessarily be impermissible under
the new zoning designation.
In 1974, the utility instituted an action for inverse condemnation, charging that the city's action in 1973 deprived it of property without just compensation.58 In a nonjury trial on the issue of liability, the state trial court
held in favor of the utility. It found that the open-space plan deprived the
landowner "of all practical, beneficial or economic use of the property
... "5'In a subsequent jury trial to determine damages, the utility was
awarded more than $3 million.6" After an initial affirmance by the California Court of Appeals, 6 ' the state supreme court ordered reconsideration of
the case in light of its decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon .62 Upon reconsideration, the state court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment.6 3
The state supreme court then declined review, and the case was appealed
to the United States Supreme Court.'
The briefs of the parties and amici before the Supreme Court indicated
some confusion concerning the precise reason why the state supreme court
in Agins, and consequently the state court of appeals in San Diego Gas &
Electric Co., had ruled that damages were not available to a landowner
who challenges the constitutionality of a local zoning or land-use regulation. As noted above, the California Supreme Court held in Agins that
landowners may not sue in inverse condemnation, converting an excessive
56. Id An open-space area was defined by the city as "any urban land or water surface
that is essentially open or natural in character, and which has appreciable utility for park
and recreation purposes, conservation of land, water or other natural resources or historic or
scenic purposes." Id at 625.
57. Id The city did recommend that the land be acquired for use as a park land. Due to
the failure of a bond referendum, this plan was never pursued. Id.
58. Id at 625-26. The utility specifically identified the city's actions which deprived it of
the beneficial use of the property as the adoption of the new zoning regulation and the openspace plan. Id at 626. The utility had, by this time, determined that the site could not be
used as a location for a nuclear power plant. Id at 626 n.6.
59. Id. at 626.
60. Id at 627.
61. 80 Cal. 3d 1026, 146 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1978)
62. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr 372 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). On
July 13, 1978, the California Supreme Court granted the city's petition for a hearing, an
action which automatically vacated the court of appeal's decision. SeeAgins, 450 U.S. at 628
(citing Cal. Rules of Ct. 976(c) and 977 (West 1981)). But, in June 1979, the court transferred
the case back to the appellate court for consideration in light ofAgins, 450 U.S. at 629.
63. This appellate court decision is unpublished but quoted extensively by the United
States Supreme Court. Id at 630.
64. Id
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65
use of the police power into a compensable "taking.
The utility company understood the state court to have ruled that exercise of a municipality's police powers to regulate land-use may never constitute a "tak[ing] for public use" under the fifth amendment.6 6 The
appellee's brief for the city of San Diego apparently adopted the same approach by arguing that, although enactment of a local regulation may violate due process, such governmental action does not involve the "taking"
clause unless property is physically invaded. 67 This theory is based on a
view that property is not taken for public use unless control of private
property is transferred to a government. Thus, a proceeding by eminent
domain falls within the fifth amendment because a government explicitly
seeks title to private property. But mere regulation, which does not disturb
private ownership, does not "take" property for public use unless physical
possession of property is actually disturbed.
The amicus brief for the United States, submitted by the Solicitor General, offered a different view of the state court's position and a more sophisticated rationale in favor of the city. The Solicitor General did not
dispute that local land-use planning may constitute a "taking" under the
fifth amendment. Rather, the Solicitor General argued that restrictions on
use of property by regulation are different than the traditional methods by
which a government may exercise dominion over private property. When a
local government brings proceedings in eminent domain, it uses judicial
machinery to enforce its decision to acquire private property. Similarly,
when a government physically invades property without the use of judicial
proceedings, a private party may bring the traditional action for inverse
condemnation in order to compel the government to pay for what it has
obtained.68
The Solicitor General contended, however, that a suit for damages
based on land-use regulation differs in an important way from either eminent domain or inverse condemnation. When a land-use or zoning regulation is enacted, a local government does not "choose" to purchase land. To
force a government to pay damages for "taking" property in such circumstances would compel it to pay for land it may never have wished to obtain. It is sufficient, argued the Solicitor General, merely to enjoin the

65. 24 Cal. 3d at 273, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375 (1979).
66. See Brief for Appellant at 17, 31, 36, San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450
U.S. 621 (1981); but see infra note 71 and accompanying text.
67. Brief for Appellee at 16-17, San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450
U.S. 621 (1981).
68. Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States at 25-28, San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
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continued operation of any land-use plan that constitutes a "taking." In
this manner, the court will vindicate the constitutional rights of a property
owner without ordering unexpected and involuntarily public
expenditures.6 9
The majority of the Supreme Court did not consider the merits of these
arguments, for the Court held that the state court had not entered a "final
judgment" in the case, which is a prerequisite for Supreme Court review.7 °
Justice Brennan, however, concluded that jurisdiction was proper and,
therefore, confronted the merits of the case in his dissent. 7 ' Joined by three
other members of the Court 72 and with the possible support of an additional justice,73 Justice Brennan concluded that the Constitution demands
that governments pay monetary compensation for property "taken" by excessive land-use regulation.74
Justice Brennan first rejected the city's contention that zoning regulations may never constitute a "taking" within the meaning of the fifth
amendment. 75 His conclusion was substantially aided by the reasoning of
Agins v. City of Tiburon, in which a unanimous Court implicitly rejected
such an argument by holding that, on the facts of that case, the two zoning
ordinances did not "take" property. The Court's analysis would have been
unnecessary if the city of San Diego's contentions were correct and zoning
ordinances could never constitute a "taking." In this regard, Agins scarcely
broke new ground; the Court was merely applying Justice Holmes' adage
that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
69. Id.at 28-31.
70. 450 U.S. at 633; id at 636 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).
71. The disagreement between the Court and the dissent on whether the state courts
had entered a final judgment centered on the proper interpretation of the state supreme
court's opinion in Agins v. City of Tiburon. Justice Brennan, adopting the views of both of
the parties, concluded that the state court had held that zoning ordinances would never
constitute a "taking" under the fifth amendment. The Court's opinion rejected this characterization and read the California court to have held merely that damages may not be
awarded for such a "taking." The Court's conclusion is supported by its earlier opinion in
Agins v. City of Tiburon, which stated that "[tihe State Supreme Court determined that
appellants could not recover damages for inverse condemnation even if the zoning ordinances constituted a taking." 447 U.S. at 263. It should be noted, however, that Justice Powell, the author of the Court's opinion inAgins, joined Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co.
72. Justices Powell, Marshall, and now-retired Justice Stewart joined Justice Brennan's
dissent. 450 U.S. at 636.
73. Justice Rehnquist indicated that if he believed that jurisdiction was proper in the
Supreme Court, he "would have little difficulty in agreeing with much of what is said in the
dissenting opinion of Justice BRENNAN." Id.at 633-34.
74. Id at 658 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. Id at 651-53.
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76
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."
Justice Brennan next considered the Solicitor General's argument that
damages are not available, even if property is "taken" by land-use regulation. 7 Justice Brennan identified two major flaws in the Solicitor General's argument. First, a decision that some "takings" need not be
compensated assumes a measure of judicial discretion that does not appear
on the face of the fifth amendment.7 8 The Constitution expressly prohibits
private property from being "taken for public use, without just
' 79
compensation.
Second, a decision in favor of the city would mean that, at least until the
offending regulation was invalidated, landowners could be barred both
from the full use of their land and compensation of their loss.80 Because
the essential purpose of "taking" analysis is to assess whether "the public
at large rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of
state power, ' a decision that property may be "taken" for some period
without being paid for by a government appears inconsistent with the purposes of the fifth amendment. Thus, Justice Brennan concluded that "once
a court finds a police power regulation has effected a 'taking,' the government entity must pay just compensation for the period commencing on the
date the regulation first effected the 'taking' and ending on the date the
government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the
regulation."82
Justice Brennan's analysis is likely to be persuasive to a majority of the
members of the Supreme Court. He already has garnered the support of at
least two, and perhaps three, other justices.83 More importantly, those justices who have expressed a view, however tentative, against the city of San
Diego's position-Brennan, Marshall, Powell and Rehnquist-span the

76. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
77. 450 U.S. at 653-60. See generally Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States, supra
note 68, at 28-31.
78. 450 U.S. at 653-54.
79. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
80. 450 U.S. at 655-56 & n.22.
81. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
82. 450 U.S. at 658 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). According to Justice
Brennan, a landowner whose property has been temporarily "taken" would be due compensation only for the period of time during which he was deprived of the full use of his property. Id at 659. The government also would retain the option, of course, to decide that it
wishes to obtain the property permanently through eminent domain proceedings. Id at 65960.
83. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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ideological spectrum of the current Court. There is a great likelihood that
one or more additional justices will join their view.
On a theoretical basis as well, Justice Brennan's position has greater analytical force than do the contentions of the city of San Diego and the
Solicitor General. The city's contention that physical invasion or the invocation of eminent domain proceedings are the sole methods of "taking" is
based on a distinction that is at odds with economic reality. Landowners
whose properties are seized by the government may suffer no greater
financial harm than landowners who are told, by means of open-space
plans, that they may not develop their property in any manner.8 4 Yet, the
city's view of the fifth amendment would establish a constitutional distinction based precisely on that difference.
With the Solicitor General's concession that land-use regulations may
constitute a "taking," his argument scarcely fares better since it is difficult
to circumvent the relatively clear constitutional command that a government may not "take" property without just compensation. Although it may
be argued with considerable force that state courts generally should be free
to fashion different remedies for constitutional wrongs so long as some
adequate remedy is provided,85 the just compensation clause is fundamentally distinct from the type of constitutional tort recognized, in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the FederalBureau of Narcotics,86 to redress violations of the fourth amendment. The fourth amendment does not
provide a remedy for its violation; the takings clause of the fifth amendment does so expressly.
It is unfortunate, nonetheless, that Justice Brennan gave scant attention
to the policy considerations underlying the city's and the Solicitor General's views. The Solicitor General's distinction between eminent domain
and traditional inverse condemnation, on one hand, and the type of action
typified by Agins and San Diego Gas & Electric Co., on the other, contains
considerable practical wisdom. And the difference, as the Solicitor General
recognized, is the likelihood that in the former cases, but not in the latter, a
municipality or local government has made an explicit choice to allocate
financial resources for the purchase of lands. The spectre inherent in both
Agins and San Diego Gas & Electric Co. is the possibility that financially84. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness.-Comments on the Ethical Founda-

tions of 'ust Compensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1186-87 (1967); see also Parrino,
United States v. 10.0 Acres: The Exclusivity of Private Easement As Protected Property in
Eminent Domain, 63 VA. L. REV. 135, 141-42 (1977).
85. See Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States at 28-29, San Diego Gas & Elec. Co.
v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1980).
86. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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strapped municipalities will hesitate to engage in beneficial land-use regulations because they may incur massive, and unforeseen, liabilities.
Justice Brennan did not give much credence to the possibility of
financial disaster. Indeed, he wondered "as an empirical matter whether
the threat of just compensation will greatly impede the efforts of planners.""7 An amici brief filed by the National Association of County Planning Directors"8 provided some evidence on just this issue. That
organization asked nearly 300 of its members whether they would adopt
zoning regulations modeled on the provision upheld in Goldblatt v. Town
of Hempstead,8 9 which closed a local sand and gravel mine. Forty-eight
percent of those polled said they would adopt the scheme and risk its invalidation. When asked whether they would attempt to close the quarry if
a successful suit by the landowner would result in an award of damages as
well as invalidation of the regulation, only eight percent of the members
polled said they would do so. 9° According to this survey, therefore, about
eighty-three percent of planners who favored adopting a zoning regulation
would be "deterred" by the possibility of successful damages actions
against the governmental fisc. 9 1
III.

WHEN A "TAKING"

OCCURS

Justice Brennan's dissent concludes that compensation must be paid "for
the period commencing on the date the regulation first effected the 'taking. "'92 If his analysis were to be adopted by the Supreme Court, great
importance would thereafter attach to determining the exact time at which
a zoning regulation "takes" property. Although Justice Brennan did not
specifically explain how courts are to decide this issue, he did state that
"[nlothing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that 'takings' must be
87. 450 U.S. at 661 n.26.
88. The amicus brief was also joined by the National Trust for Historic Preservation,
National Association of Counties, National Wildlife Federation, Preservation Action, and
National Parks and Conservation Association.
89. 369 U.S. 590 (1962); see supra note 14.
90. Amicus Curiae Brief for the National Association of County Planning Directors, et
al., at 21 n.10, San Diego Gas & Elec. Co v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1980).
91. One New York state case sheds additional light on the threat to municipal financial
liability posed by Justice Brennan's views. Horizon Adirondack Corp. v. State, 88 Misc. 2d
619, 388 N.Y.S. 2d 235 (1976) was a suit filed against the State of New York, claiming $36
million damages for the "taking" of 24,000 acres of land in the Adirondack Mountains. That
suit was dismissed on the rationale rejected by Justice Brennan in the San Diego case. If
Justice Brennan's view had prevailed in that state court litigation, and if the challenged
regulation had been found to be a "taking," the result, according to the state court, would
have had "staggering implications upon the State budget and tax system." Id at 244.
92. 450 U.S. at 653 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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permanent and irrevocable."9 3 The implication is, therefore, that a "taking" occurs whenever governmental action affects the value of property.
But such an assumption is demonstrably incorrect.
A line of Supreme Court and lower federal court cases clearly hold that
a landowner may suffer temporary economic harm without being able to
seek redress under the fifth amendment. These cases, from Danforth v.
United States94 through Agins v. City of Tiburon," recognize that governmental planning activities do not, by themselves, constitute a "taking" of
property, even if they affect landowners' ability to realize their economic
expectations. 96
This issue arose in Agins when the landowners claimed that an aborted
eminent domain proceeding resulted in a "taking" of their land.9 7 Shortly
after the city of Tiburon enacted the zoning ordinance upheld in Agins, it
began eminent domain proceedings in order to secure possession of the
appellant's property. A year later, the eminent domain proceeding was ended by the city's voluntary dismissal of its complaint.9 8 When the landowners subsequently filed their claims seeking damages, they alleged that
the abandoned eminent domain action had destroyed the value of their
property during the pendency of the proceeding and, therefore, constituted
a "taking" of property.9 9 The California Supreme Court rejected their contention, and the United States Supreme Court affirmed." °
The Supreme Court did not dispute the common-sense proposition that
the appellants' ability to sell their property may have been curtailed during
the time that eminent domain proceedings were underway. Instead, the
Court treated the fact as constitutionally irrelevant. The Court held that
"[mere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental decisionmaking [sic], absent extraordinary delay are 'incidents of ownership. They
cannot be considered as a "taking" in the constitutional sense.' "101
93. Id at 657 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. 308 U.S. 271 (1939).
95. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
96. The Agins Court relied on Danforth v. United States and the following lower court
cases in support of the principle. See, e.g., Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 596
F.2d 784 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979); Reservation Eleven Assoc. v. District of
Columbia, 420 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Virgin Islands v. 50.05 Acres of Land, 185 F.
Supp. 495 (D.V.I. 1960). See 447 U.S. at 263 n.9.
97. 447 U.S. at 258 & n.3.
98. Id at 257-58 n.l. The city of Tiburon thereupon reimbursed the landowners for
their costs incurred in defense of the action. Id This fact was not relied upon by the
Supreme Court in its Agins opinion.
99. Id at 258 n.3.
100. Id at 259 n.5, 263.
101. ld at 263 n.9 (quoting Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939)).
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The holding in Agins quotes from, and follows, the earlier Supreme
Court decision in Danforth v. United States. °2 In that case, the United
States instituted eminent domain proceedings to obtain land pursuant to
the Flood Control Act of 1928.103 The landowner claimed that his property
had been "taken" before commencement of the action when Congress enacted the statute contemplating the use of his land.'°4 The Court held that
the institution of eminent domain proceedings, and the legislation authorizing them, does not result in a "taking" until title passes at the conclusion
of the action.105 The Court noted that a different rule would force a government to "take" property before it could determine the cost of the "taking." The Court stated: "The determination of the award is an offer subject
to acceptance. . . and thus gives. . . [the government] an opportunity to
determine whether valuations leave the cost of completion within his
06
resources."1
Although both Danforth and Agins concerned aborted eminent domain
proceedings, the scope of their holdings is not so limited. For example, in
Trager v. Peabody Redevelopment Authority, ° plaintiff-landowners contended that a city council's designation of their property as "blighted" was
unconstitutional.' 0 8 In the course of its decision, the district court relied
upon Danforth to conclude that "the mere determination by a governmental authority that a particular area of real estate is 'blighted' as an initial
step in an urban renewal project is not a constructive taking. This is so
even though the determination of blight has an adverse effect on the value
of the property.""°9
Justice Brennan relied upon four cases to support his position that temporary activities may constitute "takings." In three cases, the United States
government obtained through eminent domain proceedings the right to use
buildings and property for a limited period of time."' In the fourth case,
United States v. Causby,"' the Court recognized that the government's
taking of property by means of aircraft overflights might be either tempo102. 308 U.S. 271 (1939); see supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
103. Flood Control Act of May 15, 1928, 45 Stat. 534 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 702a-702m (1976)).
104. 308 U.S. at 281-282.
105. Id at 284-85.
106. Id at 284.
107. 367 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Mass. 1973).
108. Id at 1001.
109. Id at 1002.
110. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v. Petty
Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
111. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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Court of Claims for a determinarary or permanent and remanded to the
12
"taking."'
the
of
tion of the duration
The conclusion that temporary governmental action may constitute a
"taking" does not conflict with Danforth-Agins line of precedent. Some
governmental action is so ephemeral and uncertain in its impact upon the
landowner that it will never constitute a "taking." Other governmental action, such as the physical possession and use of real property and machinery for a number of years, constitutes a sufficient deprivation of property
rights to invoke the fifth amendment, even if the government ultimately
restores use of the property to the owner.113 The distinction between those
temporary disruptions of economic expectations that constitute a "taking"
and those that do not recognizes both the legitimate governmental interest
in deferring compensation until the process of decision-making is complete
and the degree to which a landowner's right to use his land is actually
burdened.
The rule applied in Danforth and Agins serves an important governmental interest by ensuring that governments have the necessary flexibility to
debate and assess the desirability of future land-use regulations before
they go into effect. Until an eminent domain lawsuit is completed, title to
the property resides in the landowner, and the government has taken no
extra-judicial action inconsistent with the property rights of the landowner. 1 4 As the Danforth court stated, and the Agins case illustrates,
1
"[u]ntil taking the condennor may discontinue or abandon his effort."' '
Thus, even if, as alleged in the Agins case, property values are affected by
the institution of an eminent domain proceeding or a proposal to adopt a
land-use plan, those governmental activities do not pose a sufficiently concrete threat to the property rights of potentially affected landowners to be
considered "takings."
In this sense, it may be proper to view the Danforth-Agins exclusion for
"planning activities" as serving a purpose similar to that of the "ripeness"
doctrine when applied to the judicial review of administrative action. The
Supreme Court has explained that a basic rationale for the ripeness doctrine in that context is "to protect the agencies from judicial interference
112. Id at 267-68. The Court explained that "an accurate description of the property
taken is essential" in order to compute properly the damages due the landowner. Id
113. See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
114. If a government takes physical possession of property before it institutes an eminent
domain proceeding, however, the "taking" occurs at the time of the physical intrusion, not at
the time when title passes as a result of the eminent domain proceeding. See United States v.
Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1958).
115. Danforth, 308 U.S. at 284.
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until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a
concrete way by the challenging parties."' " 6 Similarly, the statutory command of the Administrative Procedure Act," 7 which allows judicial review
of "final agency action," ' permits administrative agencies to correct their
own mistakes and to apply their expertise before courts are called upon to
determine the legality of administrative decisions.' 19 Application of the
Danforth-Agins principle, like the ripeness and finality requirements, insures that the fear of premature litigation will not deter governmental bodies from formulating public policy. In the zoning context, the possible chill
to policy-making is particularly acute because the local government that
considers enacting a land use regulation may face monetary liability as
well as the prospect that the regulations will be invalidated.
The continued vitality of Danforth-Agins does not cast doubt on Justice
Brennan's conclusions in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. that land-use regulation may constitute a "taking" and that compensation must be paid once
a "taking" occurs. But these cases do raise the question whether the mere
enactment of a land-use regulation has a sufficiently concrete effect on
landowners to be considered, in any circumstances, a "taking." Given the
potential public policy difficulties that municipalities would face if forced
to formulate zoning ordinances without a clear idea of possible financial
liability, it is tempting to embrace the position that enactment of a zoning
ordinance alone, like the enactment of a law authorizing eminent domain
proceedings, does not constitute a "taking" until a more concrete controversy arises between the government and an affected landowner and until
the government can assess what its financial liability will be.
The Fifth Circuit has both considered and adopted such an approach to
the problem of municipal liability under the Just Compensation clause.
The case of Hernandez v. City of Lafayette 120 concerned the efforts of a
landowner to persuade a city to change the zoning designation applied to
his land. The plaintiff, Hernandez, owned a tract of approximately seventeen acres in the city of Lafayette. The land was zoned for single family
residential structures. Over the course of several years, the landowner tried
without success to have his land rezoned to allow more valuable uses, such
as a medical office complex or multifamily residential properties. 12 ' After
futile attempts to have the property rezoned, the plaintiff filed an action in
116. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).

117. 5 U.S.C. § 551-706 (1976).
Id §704.

118.
119.
120.
121.

F.T.C. v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980).
643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981).
Id at 1190.
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federal district court claiming that the city had refused his requests so that
it could purchase a right-of-way through his land more cheaply. 122 The
city's continued decision to zone his land only for single family residential
structures was thus alleged to be a "taking" of the property. Despite the
plaintiff's allegations, the 23district court granted a summary judgment motion in favor of the city.'
The court of appeals, taking the allegations of the plaintiffs complaint
as true for purposes of the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
held that the plaintiff had made out a claim that the city had "taken" his
property.' 24 The court went on, however, to structure a novel fifth amendment requirement based on the Danforth-Agins principle:
[I]n cases such as the one before us, where the application of a
general zoning ordinance to a particular person's property does
not initially deny the owner an economically viable use of his
land, but thereafter does come to result in such a denial due to
changing circumstances, or where a zoning classification initially
denies a property owner an economically viable use of his land,
but the owner delays or fails to timely seek relief from such a
classification, we conclude that a 'taking' does not occur until the
municipality's governing body is given a realistic opportunity
and reasonable time within which to review its zoning legislation
25
vis-a-vis the particular property and to correct the inequity.
The court's conclusion was based squarely on the Danforth-Agins principle. The court applied the Agins axiom that "[m]ere fluctuations in value
during the process of governmental decisionmaking [sic], absent extraordinary delay, are 'incidents of ownership,""' 126 to the time during which pro27
ceedings "to review and correct" a zoning classification are pending.'
During that time, a zoning regulation will not, therefore, "be considered as
a 'taking' in the constitutional sense." 12' 8
122. Id at. 1191.
123. Id at 1189. The district court opinion is unreported.
124. Id at 1200.
125. Id. (footnotes omitted).
126. Id at 1201 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63 n.9; quoting Danforth, 308 U.S. at
285).
127. Id
128. Id (quoting ,gins, 447 U.S. at 262-63 n.9; quoting Danforth, 308 U.S. at 285).
In a footnote, the court offered an alternative theory in support of its holding. The court of
appeals stated that the government must have an "intention to appropriate" land in order
for a "taking" to be effected. Id at 1201, n.28 (quoting Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d
1329, 1336 (5th Cir. 1973)). In the court's view, "[t]he City of Lafayette under the circumstances of this case would lack an intention to deny plaintiff an economically viable use of
his property until it was put on notice that its zoning regulations were effecting such a denial." Id The court's reliance on the city's intent is a trifle obscure. It may be true, as the
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The effect of the Fifth Circuit's decision is to place a procedural burden
upon a landowner who wishes to challenge the constitutionality of a zoning or land-use regulation. Even though a government may enact a zoning
ordinance that, on its face, demands immediate compliance, the Fifth Circuit requires that the local government be given an opportunity to calculate the effect of its regulation on any particular landowner before a
"taking" occurs. If the landowner raises an administrative challenge to the
zoning ordinance, and his challenge is rejected, then he may proceed directly to court with his fifth amendment claim.' 2 9 If, however, the landowner fails to bring his claim to the government's attention, then he will
not be able to show that a "taking" has occurred until the government has
had the opportunity "to review and correct" its zoning classification. Presumably, this phrase from Hernandez contemplates that a government will
have the chance, after a court rules that a zoning classification constitutes a
"taking," to rescind its regulation. The likely effect of the Hernandez rule
is, therefore, largely to eliminate the threat to the governmental fisc posed
by Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co.
This reliance upon the Danforth-Agins principle to advance the interests
of local governments is entirely appropriate. Hernandez merely extends to
takings by regulation the rule Danforth applied to eminent domain proceedings. The Danforth court explicitly distinguished between the time
when legislation authorizing condemnation is enacted and the time when
an eminent domain proceeding results in a decree that informs the government of the cost of the property it seeks to acquire. The Court explained
that "[c]ondemnation is a means by which the sovereign may find out what
any piece of property will cost."' 3 ° Hernandez guarantees the same flexibility in governmental decision-making protected by Danforth by sugSolicitor General argued in San Diego Gas and Elec. Co., that a city that adopts a land use
plan does not "intend" to incur financial liability. But it is hard to imagine that such a city
does not, at the minimum, "intend" that use of regulated land be restricted in precisely the
manner demanded by the regulation. No Supreme Court case appears to have demanded
any greater level of "intent" in order for a "taking" to occur. See San Diego Gas & Elec.
Co., 450 U.S. at 653 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The more productive avenue is, therefore, to
follow the Danforth-Agins principle and focus on the burdens placed on the government and
landowner respectively during the period of planning activities.
129. A municipality may be able to assess its potential liability even if a landowner raises
an administrative challenge. It is possible that a local government could then suspend operation of its land use regulation until it could seek a declaratory judgment that its regulation
would not effect a "taking." Once a particular landowner lodged an objection to the application of a regulation to his property, an actual conflict would be present between that landowner and the municipality. Accordingly, the municipality should be able to show a
sufficiently concrete controversy to meet the federal standards for issuance of a declaratory
judgment. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937).
130. Danforth, 308 U.S. at 284.
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gesting that a zoning regulation will not effect a "taking" until the
government has equally precise knowledge of the financial liabilities it will
incur.
Of course, Danforth and Agins are not on all fours. In an eminent domain proceeding, the landowner is under no legal compulsion until the
decree is entered; under the Hernandez rule, a statute that on its face mandates immediate compliance may still be held not to have taken property.
But, the Hernandez rule compensates for this distinction by employing a
burden-shifting device. Only if a landowner fails to raise an administrative
challenge will the effect of a statute be considered so attenuated as not to
constitute a taking. Hernandez simply balances the governmental interest
in planning for future financial liabilities against the individual's interest
in being free from untoward burdens on the immediate use of his property.
Hernandez presumes that any landowner who has not raised a specific objection in an administrative forum before proceeding to court has not been
so inconvenienced by governmental regulation as to require a finding that
a taking has occured.
This presumption reflects the "ripeness" component of the DanforthAgins principle. As noted above, an inquiry into "ripeness" requires an
assessment of whether the effects of administrative action have been "felt
in a concrete way by the challenging parties." 1 3 ' Application of the "ripeness" doctrine to preenforcement review of administrative decisions is illustrated by two leading Supreme Court cases. In Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner,'32 a group of drug manufacturers challenged a regulation
promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before the regulation had been enforced. The Court's holding that the controversy was
ripe was based, in part, on its conclusion that the regulation would have an
immediate and substantial effect on the drug companies.1 33 By contrast,
in
Toilet Goods Association, Inc. v. Gardner, 34 a companion case, the Court
held that preenforcement review of an FDA regulation was inappropriate
35
where a regulation would have only minimal impact on private parties.
The Hernandez Court implicitly concluded that a landowner who has not
bothered to challenge land-use regulations by administrative means is only
minimally burdened by the governmental action.1 36 Where the landowner
131. Abbot Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 148-49; see supra text accompanying notes 116-19.
132. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
133. Id at 152-54.
134. 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
135. Id at 164-65.
136. The Hernandez rule would presumably be controlled by the same reasoning that
renders the Danforth-Agins principle inapplicable in cases of "extraordinary delay," see
Agins, 447 U.S. at 263 n.9, or where a municipality's planning activities amount to an
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is not greatly burdened, it is appropriate to preserve the government's opportunity to discern whether its regulation is a taking and, if so, what its
liability will be.
In sum, the holding of the Fifth Circuit in Hernandez v. City of Lafayette
furthers the policy argument made by the Solicitor General in San Diego
Gas & Electric Co. But, the Hernandez rule does not go so far as to conclude, as the Solicitor General urged, that zoning ordinances may never
constitute a "taking." Rather, Hernandez simply balances the respective
private and public interests to conclude that the burden may be properly
placed on an individual landowner to make a specific objection to a local
government before it may be found that the landowner has been so burdened by regulation as to effect a "taking."
IV.

CONCLUSION

A review of two recent Supreme Court decisions concerning local zoning and land-use plans suggests that such activities will seldom constitute a
"taking" within the meaning of the fifth amendment. But, if such plans are
found to have "taken" private property, then it appears likely that a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court would be ready to rule that the
local government must pay damages to the affected landowners. The anticipated detrimental effect of such a Supreme Court decision on local treasuries may be largely avoided, however, if courts adopt the Fifth Circuit
decision in Hernandez v. City of Lafayette. The Hernandez decision limits
liability by delaying the time when a "taking" would be deemed to have
occurred until a local government has had the opportunity to consider
fully whether land use or zoning regulations, as applied to any particular
parcel of property, would constitute a "taking" within the meaning of the
fifth amendment.

"abuse of the condemnation authority." Thompson v. Tualatin Hills Park & Recreation Dist.,
496F Supp. 530, 541 (D. Or. 1980),-see Donahoe Constr. Co. v. Montgomery County Council, 567 F.2d 603, 609 (4th Cir. 1977); Richmond Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Redevelopment, 561 F.2d 1327, 1331 (9th Cir. 1977); Benenson v. United States, 548 F.2d 939, 947-48
(Ct. Cl. 1977); Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574, 586 (Ct. Cl. 1970);
Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 663 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th
Cir. 1968). These cases stand for the proposition that planning activities, which normally do
not constitute a taking, will be found to have taken property where burdens not normally
associated with the pendency of planning activities have been placed on a landowner. Thus,
a court will examine (i) the good faith of the government in beginning proceedings, (ii)
whether the government took other actions during the pendency of the proceedings to interfere with or discourage the use of property, and (iii) the amount of time during which the
proceedings were pending. See Thompson, 496 F. Supp. at 543-44.

